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Abstract— Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) attempts to 
find cryptographic protocols resistant to attacks using Shor’s 
polynomial time algorithm for numerical field problems or 
Grover’s algorithm to find the unique input to a black-box 
function that produces a particular output value. The use of non-
standard algebraic structures like non-commutative or non-
associative structures, combined with one-way trapdoor functions 
derived from combinatorial group theory, are mainly unexplored 
choices for these new kinds of protocols and overlooked in current 
PQC solutions. In this paper, we develop an algebraic extension 
ring framework who could be applied to different asymmetric 
protocols (i.e. key exchange, key transport, enciphering, digital 
signature, zero-knowledge authentication, oblivious transfer, 
secret sharing etc.). A valuable feature is that there is no need for 
big number libraries as all arithmetic is performed in   
extension field operations (precisely the AES field). We assume 
that the new framework is cryptographical secure against strong 
classical attacks like the sometimes-useful length-based attack, 
Roman’kov’s linearization attacks and Tsaban’s algebraic span 
attack. This statement is based on the non-linear structure of the 
selected platform which proved to be useful protecting the AES 
protocol. Otherwise, it could resist post-quantum attacks (Grover, 
Shor) and be particularly useful for computational platforms with 
limited capabilities like USB cryptographic keys or smartcards. 
Semantic security (IND-CCA2) could also be inferred for this new 
platform. 
     
 Keywords – Post-Quantum Cryptography, Non-
Commutative Cryptography, Rings, Finite Fields, AES, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ost-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a trend that has an 
official NIST status [1] and which aims to be resistant to 
quantum computers attacks like Shor [2] and Grover [3] 
algorithms. NIST initiated a process to solicit, evaluate, and 
standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key 
cryptographic algorithms.  Particularly Shor algorithm 
provided a quantum computing way to break asymmetric 
protocols. 
PQC not only cover against that menace, it works also as 
a response against side-channel attacks [3], the increasing 
concern about pseudo-prime generator backdoor attacks (i.e. 
Dual_EC_DRBG NSA [4]) or  the development of quasi-
polynomial discrete logarithm attacks which impact  severely 
against  current de facto standards [5, 6, 7] of asymmetric 
cryptography whose security rest on integer-factorization 
(IFP) and discrete-logarithm (DLP) over numeric fields.  
 As a response, there is a growing interest in PQC solutions 
like Lattice-based, Pairing-based, Multivariate Quadratic, 
Code-based and Hash-based cryptography [8, 9, 10], Another 
kind, and overlooked solutions belong to Non-Commutative 
(NCC) and Non-Associative (NAC) algebraic cryptography 
[11-15]. 
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Security of a canonical algebraic asymmetric protocol 
always relies on a one-way function (OWF) transformed to 
work as a one-way trapdoor function (OWTF) [11, 16]. For 
instance, using the decomposition problem (DP) or the double 
coset problem (DCP) [8, 9, 10], both assumed to belong to 
AWPP time-complexity (but out of BQP) [17, 18] problems, 
which lead to an eventual brute-force attack, thus yielding 
high computational security. A solution which does not 
require commutative subgroups is the Anshel-Anshel-
Goldberg (AAG) key-exchange protocol (KEP) [11]. 
PQC studies were purposely followed by the author over 
his past and current research [19-23]. 
2. THE ALGEBRAIC EXTENSION RING FRAMEWORK 
 
The Algebraic Extension Ring (AER) framework include 
the following structures: 
 
:  AES field [24, 25] 
Primitive polynomial: 1+x+x3+x4+x8 
Multiplicative subgroup generator: <1+x> 
 
M[, n] n-dimensional square matrix of field elements. 
(bytes). Each matrix is equivalent to a (rank-3) 
Boolean tensor. Matrix powers are obtained through 
usual rules with field sum and field product 
operations. Elements do not commute. Table I show 
the alternative views of a random element. 
 
The AER platform has two substructures: 
 
(M[, n], ⨁, O)   Abelian group using field sum as 
operation and null matrix as the identity element. 
 
 (M[, n], ⨀, I)   Non-commutative monoid using field 
product as operation and identity matrix as the identity 
element.  
 
The product distributes over sum of elements. Among 
AER elements, some are cyclic multiplicative subgroup 
generators, the rest have periodic power sets that do not 
include identity matrix (see Table II). This second class has 
therefore non-identity spurious inverses. Among matrices, 
random exploration search revealed that the proportion of 
cyclic subgroup generators decrease with increasing 
dimension. The multiplicative order of that kind of matrices 
and the conditions under which the cyclic subgroup feature 
appears, are open questions that should be further studied. 
The inverses of each element are obtained by computing 
the multiplicative order of each one, no general algorithm is 
known, and this fact could represent a cryptographic 
advantage because obtaining inverses of AER elements 
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require an unrestrained exploration.  
 
TABLE I 
REPRESENTATION OF A  2-DIMENSIONAL AER-RING ELEMENTS. 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
POWER SET OF AN AER-ELEMENT WITH  SPURIOUS IDENTITY 
 
 
 
Table II: successive power list (1 to 18) of a random element 
(orange red) that generate a 17-period ending in a spurious 
identity (blue magenta) and the previous one  (yellow) is a 
suprious inverse.. This is the reason why the AER structure is a 
ring but not a field, since some elements have no multiplicative 
order. 
3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASPECTS 
The choice of the  field AES)  [24] to generate the 
AER-structure is a central feature of this framework because 
it assures strong confidence that no linearization attack 
against the AER framework could succeed, i.e. Roman’kov 
three described types [26] or Tsaban Algebraic Span Attack 
[27].  
Security of a canonical asymmetric cipher protocol always 
relies on a one-way Trapdoor Function (OWTF) [16]. Here 
we propose Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) protocols 
selecting algebraic schemes as the one-way trapdoor 
function.  If the algebraic structure and OWTF are well 
selected, a provably secure protocol could be developed [11]. 
This sounds simple, but it is not easy to prove such a claim 
[28, 29]; so, caution at use is strongly advised. Commonly 
used OWTF in non-commutative cryptography (NCC) are, 
among others [11]: 
 
1. (CSP) The conjugacy search problem given a recursive 
presentation of a group G and two elements g, h ∈ G, find 
out whether there is an element x ∈ G, such that x −1g x 
= h. 
2. (DSP) The decomposition search problem given a 
recursive presentation of a group G, two recursively 
generated subgroups A, B ⊆ G, and two elements g, h ∈ 
G, find two elements x ∈ A and y ∈ B that would satisfy  
x g y = h, provided at least one such pair of elements 
exists.  
3. (DCP) The double coset problem is a special case of the 
decomposition search problem, where A=B. 
4. (XTDP) The extended triple decomposition problem: a 
strong extension of Kurt’s Triple Decomposition 
Problem who up to date resists the most advanced 
algebraic span linearization attack [27]. XTDP is 
described and applied elsewhere [23]. 
 
In this paper, we use the Anshel-Anshel-Goldberg (AAG-
KEP) protocol for  a key-exchange protocol [11]. The 
advantage of AAG is that it does not require commutative 
subgroups of a non-commutative platform, it requires only 
efficiently solvable word problem of any non-abelian 
algebraic structure. This implies an efficient inverse 
computation, an open question for the present framework 
which has a singular derived solution for 2-dimensional AER.  
4. AAG-KEP 
Let G be a public non-commutative structure that has an 
efficient resolution for the WP (word problem) and public 
elements A: {a1,…, ak} and B: {b1,…, bm}.The protocol 
security relies on two problems: SCSP (simultaneous 
conjugation search problem) and MSP (membership search 
problem). Conjugation is represented as a power: xy = y-1x y 
 
(a) Alice chooses (at random) a private element x e G as 
a word in A, that is x = f(a1, ..., ak) and sends (b1x, ..., 
bmx)  to Bob. 
(b) Bob chooses (at random) a private element y e G as 
a word in B, that is y = g(b1,…, bm) and sends (a1y,…, 
aky) to Alice. 
(c) Alice computes f(a1y,…, aky) ª xy = y-1xy and pre-
multiplies it by x-1. 
(d) Bob computes g(b1x,…, bmx) ª yx = x-1yx, pre-
multiplies it by y-1, finally invert the obtained word 
leaving x-1y-1xy 
(e) Both end with the same key, the commutator [x, y]. 
5. COMPUTING INVERSE ELEMENTS IN 2-DIMENSION AER  
No polynomial time algorithm is known for computing 
directly the inverses of AER elements, but a sequential search 
could work in case of low dimensions. The strategy is based 
on the forced periodic behavior of all power sets. In AER, we 
empirically found that the first repeating element, so periods 
are not preceded by an aperiodic sequence. Therefore, if we 
find the period (p) of a power set of a base (x) AER element 
who ends with the identity (x, x2, x3,…, xp=1), the 
penultimate of the set is an inverse of the considered element 
(xp-1=x-1). In numeric fields, any power set end always with 
the multiplicative identity but in AER this is not true and 
spurious identities appears (Table II), in this case no 
multiplicative order could be derived and his previous 
element of the power set sequence act as an spurious inverse. 
To obtain the period (p) of the power set, we could use 
Floyd algorithm [30] or Floyd-Brent algorithm [31]. 
Computing powers could be efficiently solved using the fast 
square-and-multiply algorithm [16].  
  
 
For 2-dimensional AER, a non-sequential shortcut allows 
fast inverse computation without previous period 
determination. As powers of any order could be efficiently 
computed and pigeonhole principle predicts that the cardinal 
of 2-dimensional AER-elements (=2564-1) is unavoidably a 
multiple of any period and the 2564-2 power of any element 
(x) is an inverse (x-1). This solves the low dimensional cases 
but for higher dimension this approach becomes impractical, 
as Table III shows.  
 
TABLE III 
CARDINALITY OF AER SETS 
 
Dimension Cardinal 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
4.294967296 × 10
4.722366482869645 × 10
3.402823669209384 × 10
1.60693804425899 × 10
4.973232364097866 × 10
1.008691358627698 × 10
1.340780792994259 × 10
 
 
We define a tensor determinant as the generalized 
determinant of an AES element using field sum and product 
instead of arithmetic operations. 
Recent results show that spurious inverses and identities 
appears when the tensor determinant of the tested AES 
element is null. We call this case a singular tensor. 
A step forward to develop an efficient computation of the 
periods of AES elements is to use the divisors list of the 
respective cardinality minus one (see Table III). Each period 
of a cyclic subgroup (and spurious behavior) must be a divisor 
of the multiplicative group size (Lagrange), trials of 
increasing divisors are used until the first identity (or spurious 
identity) appears.   
6. STEP-BY-STEP EXAMPLE 
The Appendix present an example of the AAG-KEP 
worked out using AER elements and Mathematica language. 
Black text corresponds to language input, blue text the 
corresponding output, in red there are comments and in 
magenta the obtained shared key. The new derived functions 
are: rmat - a random AER element, TProd[x,y] - field product 
of x and y AER elements and TFastPower[x,n] - the power 
xn. Inverses of elements are obtained in one-step using a 
power function with the defined limit as the special exponent 
explained in the previous section, a forced multiple of the 
multiplicative order. 
7. PROTOCOL SECURITY 
AAG is clearly a PQC protocol, resisting currently 
defined quantum algorithms. Classical attacks, i.e. the length-
based attack, are described elsewhere [Myasnikov]. If no 
polynomial time attack algorithm work, security relies on the 
dimension used (see Table III.). For real life application it is 
suggested to use A and B sets with at least 100 elements each. 
Overall security could be increased if an efficient inverse 
computation algorithm could be derived for elements of 
higher dimension, but it is also possible to use 2 or 3-
dimensional AER elements if the public sets (A, B) are of 
considerable size, making unfeasible classical cryptanalytic 
attacks.  
8. SEMANTIC SECURITY 
Random elements of the AER structure are achieved using 
uniformly random bytes. It is obvious that random elements 
have no bias and therefore are all indistinguishable. Field 
operations (sum product, powers and inverses) do not 
generate special subsets of elements that could segregate 
shared keys from any other random element. Therefore, it 
could be inferred that this protocol has semantic security at 
IND-CCA2 level [32, 33]. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
At present work, a new kind of non-commutative 
framework is presented as a secure platform for canonical 
asymmetric protocols. The main advantage is the use a 
matricial ring with AES field operations instead of ordinary 
arithmetic, providing assurance against linearization and 
algebraic attacks. A full 2-dimensional elements 
implementation is presented and if polynomial time 
resolution of inverses computation could be derived, this 
could be generalized to higher dimensions. Some arguments 
are given to support the semantic security of the framework. 
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